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Recent Decisions
Constitutional Law - Counsel For Indigent Defendant En-
titled To Compensation Under The Fifth Amendment. Dillon v.
United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964). Petitioner, a court-
appointed counsel, represented an indigent defendant in a proceeding
seeking to set aside a conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). At the
conclusion of the case and at the invitation of the court, counsel sub-
mitted a petition for reasonable compensation for services performed
and expenses incurred. The court ordered the Attorney General of the
United States to show cause why petitioner should not receive such
compensation. After the hearing on the order, the court concluded
that the appointment of petitioner as counsel for the indigent defendant
was a taking for a public use of the petitioner's work product, facilities,
time, skill and expertise and that such a taking was compensable under
the fifth amendment. The court set just payment at the rate of $35 per
hour plus incidental expenses; total payment to petitioner was $3,804.54.
The court, in finding a compensable taking, relied upon Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), in which the Supreme Court
allowed compensation under the fifth amendment for materialmen's
liens lost when a boat was seized by the government for default on a
boat building contract. The claim in Armstrong, as in the present case,
was predicated upon the "premise of a judicial implementation of the
self-executing exigencies of the fifth amendment itself." 230 F. Supp.
at 492. The court also referred to those cases in which compensation
claims were predicated upon a theory of implied contract. United States
v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552 (1895); United States
v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888). See also United States v. Lynah,
188 U.S. 445 (1903). The court stated that petitioner should not
have to bear alone society's obligation to provide due process to an
indigent defendant. Cf. State v. Henley, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S.W.
352 (1897).
Shortly after this decision Congress passed the Criminal Justice
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 552 (1964). Under the provisions of the Act,
court appointed counsel in federal cases will receive up to $15 per hour
for in-court time and up to $10 per hour for reasonable out-of-court
time. A maximum payment of $300 for misdemeanors and $500 for
felonies is also established for both trial and appellate levels; however,
under extraordinary circumstances, trial counsel's fee may be raised.
A provision is also made to reimburse counsel for expenses reason-
ably incurred.
Courts in Maryland appoint trial counsel under Rule 719 of the
Maryland Rules of Procedure, MD. CODE ANN. Rule 719 (Vol. 9B,
Supp. 1964). Payment of such counsel is the duty of the county officer
in the county of the forum. MD. CODE ANN. art. 26, § 12 (1957);
County Comm. of Worcester Co. v. Melvin, 89 Md. 37, 42 Atl. 910
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(1899). Provision is made for appointment of counsel in post-convic-
tion proceedings by the Maryland Post-Conviction Procedure Act, MD.
CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 645A-S (Supp. 1964), and Rules BK 40-48
of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, MD. CODE ANN. Rules BK40-48
(Vol. 9B, Supp. 1964). See particularly Rule BK 42. Typical fees
for trial counsel in all but the most serious cases are $50 to $75 and
$200 for services on appeal; the usual fee for an appeal in a post-con-
viction proceeding is $50 to $75. Brumbaugh & Ester, Indigent Accused
Persons' Project - Maryland, Oct. 1963 (unpublished report for the
American Bar Foundation in University of Maryland Law Library).
Copyrights - Loudspeaker Broadcasts Of Records By Mer-
chandise Mart Considered Public Performance For Profit. Chappell
& Co. v. Middletown Farmers Market & Auction Co., 334 F.2d 303
(3d Cir. 1964). The plaintiffs, copyright owners of certain musical
compositions, brought separate actions in the district court against the
defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation operating a merchandise mart.
The plaintiffs charged specifically that defendant had violated section
1(e) of the Copyright Act which gives copyright owners exclusive
rights to reproduce their musical compositions by mechanical means
and to perform their copyrighted works publicly for profit. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1 (e) (1958). While stipulating that the records were played over
its loudspeaker system, the defendant contended that such renditions
were permissible because they were directed toward the sales promo-
tion of the records, thus benefitting the copyright owners. Without
deciding whether the record broadcasts were connected with the defen-
dant's sales promotions, the trial judge rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs holding that said musical compositions were "publicly per-
formed for profit ... for the entertainment and amusement of patrons
attending such place and to make such place of business an attractive
place for the patronage of the general public." 334 F.2d at 305-06.
In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the term "for profit" within the context
of the statute and concluded that there was sufficient basis for the trial
court's finding that the performance amounted to a public perform-
ance for profit. The word profit was employed in the sense of com-
mercial, as opposed to purely philanthropic, use rather than direct
pecuniary benefit. Remick v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d
411, 412 (6th Cir. 1925), citing, Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591
(1917). See also LATMAN, HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW 142-47 (4th
ed. 1962). Note, Public Performance for Profit Through the Medium
of Copyrighted Musical Compositions, 25 MISS. L.J. 295, 299-302
(1964). The court pointed out that authorization had been given by
the copyright owners to record the musical compositions and to sell
the recordings, and therefore the exclusive right to reproduce by
mechanical means had been released. However, the right to use the
records in a public performance for profit was not automatically re-
leased thereby and remained exclusively reserved to the copyright
owners. Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929).
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Furthermore, the court stated that sections 1(e) and 27 did not
authorize such performances even in connection with sales promotions
of the records themselves. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(e), 27 (1958). The court
stated that the advertising value to the copyright owner of the broad-
cast of the musical composition is no defense to a suit for infringe-
ment of copyright. M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291
Fed. 776, 779-80 (D. N.J. 1923).
Criminal Law - Non-Disclosure Of Evidence Favorable To
The Accused Violates Due Process. Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842
(4th Cir. 1964). Petitioner Barbee was convicted in a Maryland court
of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and shooting a police officer.
At the trial, the prosecution produced three eyewitnesses to the shoot-
ing, all of whom identified the petitioner. The prosecution also pro-
duced, for identification, a .32 caliber pistol found on the petitioner
when he was arrested. Unknown to either the defense or the court,
the police had made fingerprint and ballistics checks of the pistol which
tended to exculpate the petitioner since they were negative. There was
doubt as to the prosecutor's knowledge of the tests, but, in any case,
they were not introduced into evidence at the trial. Petitioner was
convicted. About a year after his conviction, he sought relief under
the Maryland Post-Conviction Procedure Act, MD. CODE ANN. art. 27,
§ 645A (1957); however, the application was denied. Barbee v.
Warden, 220 Md. 647, 151 A.2d 167 (1959). Petitioner then applied
for federal habeas corpus relief, alleging a denial of due process on the
basis of the non-disclosure of the possibly exculpatory evidence; his
application was denied by the district court.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding
that introduction of the gun and withholding results of the tests was
a denial of due process. It based the decision on the statement of the
Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963): "The
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused...
violates due process." In the Brady case, however, the prosecutor had
had knowledge of the undisclosed evidence. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d
1421 (1954). In this case the court took the next step and eliminated
the requirement that the prosecutor be aware of the exculpatory evi-
dence. The court admitted that it was possible that the state could
still have secured a conviction; however, the court refused to speculate
about the influence of the evidence upon the fact finder. See Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
Some states have reached a similar result where there has been
suppression of evidence without knowledge on the part of the prosecu-
tor. See People v. Hoffner, 208 Misc. 117, 129 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Queens
County Ct. 1952). This is, however, the first federal case exactly on
point. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d
Cir. 1955) and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1958). Other states,
which have not treated the instant problem, reason that it is the prose-
cutor's duty, as a public official, to ensure the justice of the trial, and
misconduct on his part which is prejudicial to the defendant requires
1965]
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reversal of a conviction. See State v. Hild, 240 Iowa 1119, 39 N.W.2d
139 (1949); State v. Kassabian, 69 Nev. 146, 243 P.2d 264 (1952).
See also United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 904 (1952). For further reference see
Note, Duty of Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUM.
L. REV. 858 (1960).
Sales - Uniform Commercial Code-Warranty Extends To
"Buyer" Employee. Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199
A.2d 463 (1964). Plaintiff, employed as manager of a hotel, personally
purchased on behalf of his employer, four bottles of champagne, pro-
duced and bottled by the defendant-corporation, for use and consump-
tion by guests of the hotel. While plaintiff was preparing to serve the
wine, a cap from one of the bottles suddenly ejected and hit plaintiff
in the eye. Plaintiff brought suit under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-314, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-314(2) (c), (e) (1954),
alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability. In an earlier
case, Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575
(1963), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that U.C.C. § 2-318,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1954), which extends the seller's
warranty to a buyer's family or guests, did not extend the warranty of
merchantability to an employee of the purchaser. However, in Hoch-
gertel the court acknowledged that they had abandoned the strict
privity requirements in food cases and now permitted the extension of
the warranty of merchantability to sub-purchasers in the distributive
chain. The court differentiated the principal case from Hochgertel on
the grounds that plaintiff was a "buyer" as defined in Section 2-103
of the U.C.C., 12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-103 (1954), and
therefore was included in the distributive chain. The court, treating
the principal case as a "food case", ruled that Hochgertel did not fore-
close the inclusion of the actual purchaser even though he be an em-
ployee of the party to whom title to the product passed and therefore
he should not be excluded from the benefits of the warranty. The dis-
senting opinion stated that under the principles of agency, title and
complete interest passed to the employer as the legal and real purchaser
within the definition of U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33), PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, § 1-201(32), (33) (1954). Cf. Jakubowski v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275, 282 (1963); 24
MD. L. REV. 220 (1964).
In cases decided prior to the enactment of the U.C.C., the Mary-
land Court of Appeals had consistently denied recovery on the theory
of implied warranty where there was no privity of contract. Vaccarino
v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943); Poplar v. Hochschild,
Kohn & Co., 180 Md. 389, 24 A.2d 783 (1942) ; Flaccomio v. Eysink,
129 Md. 367, 100 At. 510 (1916). However, in Vaccarino the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in dictum stated that the requisite privity existed
in members of the immediate family. 31 A.2d at 318. The dissenting
opinion in the principal case also pointed out that the case was not a
"food case", but was an action based upon the alleged inadequacy of
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the package container. In a 1942 decision, the Maryland Court of
Appeals cited with approval an Illinois case, Crandall v. Stop and Shop,
Inc., 288 Ill. App. 543, 6 N.E.2d 685 (1937), holding that the war-
ranty of merchantability applies only to the contents and not to the
container. Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 180 Md. 389, 393-4,
24 A.2d 783 (1942). See Atwell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 152 A.2d
196 (D.C. 1959), applying Maryland law. However, under § 2-314
of the U.C.C., MD. CODE ANN. art. 95B, § 2 -3 14(2)(e) (1957),
"Goods to be merchantable must be . . . adequately contained, [and]
packaged. . . ." For further reference see Medallion Wine Corp. v.
Legum, 158 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1946); Note, 21 MD. L. REV. 247
(1961); 18 MD. L. REV. 268 (1958); Note, 7 MD. L. REV. 82 (1942).
Torts - Landlord Liable For Injuries Caused By The Natural
Accumulation Of Ice And Snow On Common Walks And Passage-
ways. Langley Park Apartments, Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 199
A.2d 620 (1964). Plaintiff, tenant in a multiple housing development,
was injured when she slipped and fell on a natural accumulation of
snow on a common walkway providing access to her apartment. The
action was brought against the owner and the manager as landlords
for failure to remove the snow from walkways under their control.
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the plain-
tiff, holding that a landlord of a multi-family apartment building may
be liable for injuries sustained by tenants due to the natural accumu-
lation of ice and snow on common walkways under his control, pro-
vided he knew or had reason to know of the dangerous condition and
failed to protect against it. In reaching the decision, the court followed
the principle set forth in Elmar Gardens, Inc. v. Odell, 227 Md. 454,
177 A.2d 263 (1961), i.e., when a landlord retains control of passage-
ways and stairways to be used in common by all tenants, he must exer-
cise ordinary care to maintain those portions of the premises in a rea-
sonably safe condition. See also Ross v. Belzer, 199 Md. 187, 85 A.2d
799 (1952); 5 M.L.E. Landlord and Tenant § 193 (1961), and cases
cited therein.
In so holding the Maryland Court adhered to the view known as
the "Connecticut Rule" which was first enunciated in Reardon v.
Shimelman, 112 Conn. 383, 128 Atl. 705 (1925). See recent cases
applying this rule: Young v. Saroukos, 185 A.2d 274, aff'd, 189 A.2d
437 (Del. 1963); Fincher v. Fox, 107 Ga. App. 695, 131 S.W.2d 651
(1963). The opposing view, the "Massachusetts Rule", was first
expressed in Woods v. Naumbeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357,
45 Am. Rep. 344 (1883), where it was held that a landlord was not
liable for failure to remove a natural accumulation of ice and snow.
The holding was based upon the principle that the landlord's only
duty with respect to common passageways is to maintain them in the
same condition of safety as they appeared to be when the tenancy
commenced. Smolesky v. Kotler, 270 Mass. 32, 169 N.E. 486 (1930).
However, the landlord may be held liable if there is an express or
implied contract establishing this duty. See Spack v. Longwood Apart-
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ments, Inc., 338 Mass. 518, 155 N.E.2d 873 (1959). The Massa-
chusetts rule has been subjected to various criticisms. See Massor v.
Yates, 137 Ore. 569, 3 P.2d 784 (1931) ; United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
Paine, 26 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1928). Writers have stressed the im-
practicability of requiring tenants in multi-family apartment complexes
to remove the ice and snow themselves. 41 COLUM. L. REV. 349
(1941); see HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 27.17 (1956). For
additional information see Robinson v. Belmont-Buckingham Holding
Co., 94 Colo. 534, 31 P.2d 918 (1934) ; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 63
(3d ed. 1964); 29 TENN. L. REV. 307 (1962); 31 CIII.-KENT L. REV.
271 (1952-53). Cases are collected in Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 610 (1952).
Trade Regulation-Non-Signer Provisions Of Fair Trade Legis-
lation Violate State Constitution. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v.
White Cross Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964). The
Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 7-11 (1960),
includes a nonsigner provision under which it is unfair competition for
one who is not a party to, but has notice of, a fair trade contract to
sell a product at less than the price stipulated for that product in the
fair trade contract. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 8 (1960). Plaintiff, the
manufacturer of products distributed under the "Squibb" trademark,
had established minimum retail prices for the products in Pennsyl-
vania by means of fair trade contracts with certain Pennsylvania re-
tailers. Defendants were not parties to these contracts, but they had
knowledge of them. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from retail-
ing the products at prices less than the minimum prices stipulated in
the fair trade contracts. The injunction was granted in the lower court.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding, the
non-signer provisions of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act to be in
violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution as an unlawful delegation
to private persons of the legislative power of price regulation. PA.
CONST. art. 11, § 1. In doing so, the court explicitly overruled, as
erroneous, its previous finding of constitutionality of the non-signer
provision in Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 270, 115 A.2d
361 (1955).
The validity of non-signer provisions under the due process clause
of the United States Constitution was established in Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
Although the non-signer provisions have been widely attacked on the
basis of objections arising under state constitutions, prior to 1949 the
courts of all states had held them to be valid. Note, Fair Trade and
the State Constitutions - A New Trend, 10 VAND. L. REV. 415
(1957). However, since 1949, the majority of state courts in which
the non-signer provisions have been tested, have found them to be in
violation of state constitutional guarantees, resulting in a confusion of
state decisions which are irreconcilable. Annot. 60 A.L.R. 2d 420
(1958).
State courts have held that non-signer provisions violate state
constitutional guarantees of due process, Olin Mathieson Chemical
[VOL. XXV
RECENT DECISIONS
Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956); contra, General
Electric Co. v. Klein, 34 Del. Ch. 491, 106 A.2d 206 (1954), and equal
protection, Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., .. Fla...,
40 So. 2d 371 (1949); but see, Max Factor Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.
2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936), and that such provisions are outside the
scope of the state's police power. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry
Co., 274 Ala. 270, 147 So. 2d 797 (1962); contra, Plough, Inc. v.
Hague & Knott Super Market, 211 Tenn. 480, 365 S.W.2d 884
(1963). For a case holding contrary to the principal case see Ely Lilly
& Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939). For an up-
to-date listing of the present status of state fair trade acts see 2 TRADE
REG. REP. 1 6041 (1964).
In Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Cohen, 234 F. Supp. 80
(E.D. Pa. 1964), the court held that resale price maintenance pro-
visions of fair trade agreements entered into pursuant to the Pennsyl-
vania Fair Trade Act are valid and enforceable. The court stated that
the court in the principal case did not determine by implication that
the Fair Trade Act was unconstitutional as applied to these fair trade
agreements.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has consistently upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Maryland Fair Trade Act, MD. CODE ANN. art.
83, § 107 (1957). See Home Utilities Co. v. Revere Copper and
Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610, 122 A.2d 109 (1956); see also Goldsmith
v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939). For fur-
ther reference see Conant, Resale Price Maintenance: Constitutionality
of Non-Signer Clauses, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1961); 5 M.L.E.
Constitutional Law § 343 (1960).
Waste By Life Tenant - Applicability Of Statute Of Glou-
cester. Worthington Motors v. Crouse, .. Nev. .. , 390 P.2d 229
(1964). The remaindermen sued the tenant per autre vie for waste.
A statute of Nevada provides that the remedy for waste shall be treble
damages. NEV. REV. STAT. § 40-150 (1957). The plaintiffs, how-
ever, contended that the Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 5
(repealed), which created a procedure, the writ of waste, and a remedy,
treble damages and forfeiture of the thing wasted, was a part of the
law of Nevada and that he was, therefore, entitled to forfeiture of the
life estate as well as treble damages. The district court awarded plain-
tiffs $5,000 and forfeited the tenancy per autre vie, giving the plain-
tiffs immediate possession of the property as owners in fee simple. The
Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court and held that
Nevada had not adopted the Statute of Gloucester as a part of the
common law and that forfeiture, as a remedy for waste, is not allowed
in the absence of a permissible statute. See IV SIMES & SMITH, THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1658 (1956) and RESTATEMENT, PROP-
ERTY § 198 (1936). The court took cognizance of the fact that the
Statute of Gloucester was ignored for 300 years in England after its
enactment was repealed in 1879. The court reasoned that its obsoles-
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cence in England coupled with the severity of its remedy justified the
position that the Statute was not automatically adopted as part of the
common law because it was not adaptable to the new world conditions
as they existed in the state of Nevada. See Smith v. Smith, 219 Ark.
304, 241 S.W.2d 113, 114 (1951).
The Statute of Gloucester is considered as a part of the common
law in several states, and the remedy of forfeiture and treble damages
is thus available in an action for waste. In other states, as in Nevada,
these historic statutes exist in modified form as statutory remedies in-
volving forfeiture and/or multiple damages. For a listing of each state
and its available remedies for waste see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 20.18 (1952-54) and RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 198-9
(1936). The Statute became a part of the common law of Maryland.
1 ALEXANDER'S BRITISH STATUTES 112 (Coe's ed. 1912). See also
Maryland's "reception" provision in the Declaration of Rights, art. 5.
The reason for the adoption of the Statute was set forth in the early
case of Thurston v. Mustin, 23 Fed. Cas. 1176, 1178-79 (No. 14,013)
(C.C.D.C. 1828): "The Statute of Gloucester . . . is believed to have
been by experience found applicable to the local and other circumstances
of the inhabitants of Maryland." However, this Statute now appears
to be obsolete, for action on the case in the nature of waste to recover
for the "actual damage committed" is the usual procedure, Dickinson
v. Baltimore, 48 Md. 583, 589, 30 Am. Rep. 492, 494 (1878). See
also 1 POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 164 (5th ed. 1925). White
v. Wagner, 4 H. & J. 373, 392, 7 Am. Dec. 674, 678 (Md. 1818), in-
dicates that the Statute may be used for the purposes of determining
what persons are liable for waste. However, Section 93 of Article 16
of the Annotated Code of Maryland allows double damages if an injunc-
tion to stay waste is violated (Supp. 1964).
Workmen's Compensation - Rehabilitation And Subsequent
Higher Wages Justify Suspension Of Compensation. Symons V.
Aational Electric Products, Inc., 414 Pa. 505, 200 A.2d 871 (1964).
Claimant sustained an occupational injury compelling the amputation
of both legs. Accordingly, the defendant agreed to compensate claimant
for total disability. As the result of a successful rehabilitation pro-
gram, claimant was able to resume work for defendant at wages in
excess of those received by him at the time of the accident. Defendant,
having paid the maximum compensation required for the loss of two
legs, then petitioned the Workmen's Compensation Board to suspend
further payments unless the disability was to be considered "total"
under Section 306(c) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 513 (1952), as amended, 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 513
(Supp. 1963). The Workmen's Compensation Board, on the basis of
the rehabilitation and the re-employment at higher wages, found that
the claimant was not "totally" disabled and ordered the suspension of
payments. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the sus-
pension and authorized the Board to "retain jurisdiction in the eventu-
ality that there occurs a change in claimant's present status".
[VOL. XXV
RECENT DECISIONS
Generally, the legal consequences of rehabilitation, in reference to
statutory re-opening provisions permitting the modification of an
award, have not been exposed to judicial consideration. However,
when considering the consequences of increased wages, there does exist
a general rule stating that an award of compensation is not subject to
modification as the wages of the employee vary. See 101 C.J.S. Work-
men's Compensation § 854 (1958); 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LAW §§ 57.20-57.66 (1961); Annot., 149 A.L.R. 413 (1944).
For further reference see Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Com-
pensation for Industrial Accidents Here and A broad, 42 CALIF. L. REV.
530, 553-56 (1954); 50 Ky. L.J. 249 (1961).
The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act, MD. CODE ANN.
art. 101, § 40(b) (1957), authorizes the Commission to modify an
award where aggravation, diminution or termination of the disability
occurs. The Maryland Court of Appeals has not decided whether an
employee's successful rehabilitation and subsequent increased earnings
would justify suspension of payments in an action brought by an em-
ployer under section 40(b) of the Act. See Albert F. Goetze, Inc. v.
Pistorio, 201 Md. 152, 92 A.2d 762 (1952), and Jackson v. Bethlehem-
Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc., 189 Md. 583, 56 A.2d 702 (1948).
The court, when considering wages in original proceedings, has appar-
ently leaned in the direction of the general rule stated above. See
Belschner v. Anchor Post Products, Inc., 227 Md. 89, 175 A.2d 419
(1961), and Baltimore Tube Co., Inc. v. Dove, 164 Md. 87, 164 Atl.
161 (1933).
For further reference relating to the rehabilitation problem, see
Allan, The Economics of Rehabilitation, 24 TENN. L. REV. 475
(1956); Horovitz, Rehabilitation of Injured Workers - Its Legal
and Administrative Problems, 31 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 485 (1959);
Leonard, Legal Roadblocks to Rehabilitation, A.B.A. SECT. INS. N. &
CL. 229 (1963), and Sterner, Rehabilitation of Injured Employees,
A.B.A. SECT. INS. N. & CL. 243 (1963).
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